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Abstract
We provide evidence about the determinants of the wage structures of developing
countries by examining the case of Brazil. We ask if Brazil's dramatic income and wage
dierentials can be explained by the division of rents between rms and employees, unlike
in competitive markets. Using detailed matched employer-employee panel data, covering
a large share of manufacturing from 1997 to 2002, we consider the endogeneity of prots
by adopting dierent measures of prots, dierent instruments and controls for spell xed
eects. Our results, robust to dierent tests, indicate no evidence of rent sharing, in
contrast with ndings for most developed countries.
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11 Introduction
Although 80% of the world's population lives in developing countries, there is considerably
less empirical evidence about the labour markets of these countries than about the labour
markets of developed countries. Moreover, such lack of evidence may be something particularly
important to address, as the high levels of inequality present in developing countries indicate
that a considerable share of their populations endure particularly low levels of welfare.
Brazil is an important case in point, as it is a large developing country that exhibits one
of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. According to the WorldBank (2005),
Brazil's Gini index in 2001 was 59.3, the eighth highest in a list of 123 countries, and the second
highest outside of Africa, even if it has been decreasing moderately since 1993 (Ferreira et al.
2006). Moreover, while Brazil's inequality may be in
uenced by the informality of its labour
market (28% of the workforce, when excluding the self-employed, according to World Bank
and IPEA, 2002), and also by its disparate levels of human capital, inequality is also extremely
high inside the formal sector (Arbache & Negri 2004).
In this paper, we focus on wage inequality in the formal labour market and seek to assess
what may be the role of rent sharing. Our motivation for this specic analysis is driven by
the evidence that the division of rents between employers and their employees is an important
component of the explanation of wage dierentials, certainly in developed countries (Abowd
& Lemieux 1993, Blanch
ower et al. 1996, Van Reenen 1996, Bronars & Famulari 2001, Arai
2003, Martins forthcoming) and maybe also in developing countries (Teal 1996, Revenga
1997, Bigsten et al. 2003). Moreover, rent sharing is also typically related to other sources
of inequality, including gender and racial discrimination (Black & Strahan 2001), which may
also be relevant in the case of developing countries.
However, employers in developing countries may be relatively immune to wage bargaining
pressures exerted by their employees. Amongst other factors, unions are typically not particu-
larly strong outside the developed world; minimum wages tend to be low or not enforced at all;
and unemployment benets do not exist in many countries. Moreover, as suggested before, the
size of the informal labour market may imply that rms face 
atter labour supply curves, thus
weakening the bargaining power of workers in the formal sector. On the other hand, Brazil's
relatively stringent employment law may increase the workers' bargaining power, although
2possibly at the cost of increased informality.1 However, the employment law's (unintended)
incentives for worker turnover, related to the fact that social insurance individual accounts
are remunerated at below-market rates may also make it more dicult for workers to bargain
over rents.
Another motivation point in our study is that we are able to draw on particularly detailed
data, better than that available for many developed countries, which allow us to tackle some
econometric problems that arise when estimating rent sharing. The data result from three
dierent individual- and/or rm-level panels covering the period 1997-2002. In particular,
one of the data sets includes several variables for all individual workers of all manufacturing
sector rms with more than 30 employees (plus a sample of smaller rms), resulting in an
extremely large coverage.
Finally, Brazil's economic and political history over the period we study oers a num-
ber of complementary identication strategies. In particular, we use instruments based on
several macroeconomic shocks, related to sudden and sharp movements in exchange and in-
terest rates, which are likely to aect dierent rms dierently (namely depending on their
export propensities). Moreover, we also proxy rents using `gross prots' (i.e. prots before
subtracting the wage bill), in order to avoid the bias that arises from the fact that rms that
share more rents will also have lower net prots, the standard measure of rents used in the
literature (Martins forthcoming). Finally, we also account for (time-invariant) worker and
rm heterogeneity using spell xed eects.
Our evidence, robust to dierent checks, indicates that, once endogeneity and/or hetero-
geneity are addressed, rent sharing is not an important explanation for wage dierentials in
Brazil. This is a result that we nd surprising given the previously-mentioned ndings in the
literature, although not so much when taking into account some of the specic characteristics
of the Brazilian labour market mentioned before.
The structure of the remaining of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the data
and some descriptive statistics, Section 3 presents the results under dierent econometric
assumptions and our robustness tests, and Section 4 concludes.
1Botero et al. (2004) classify Brazil as the 32nd most rigid employment legislation and the 23rd highest ring
costs in their ranking of 85 countries. See also Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) for an analysis of wage dierences
across rms and workers in the state of S~ ao Paulo.
32 Data
The data set used in this paper is derived from two main data sources, RAIS and PIA, which
we use to cover the period 1997 to 2002. RAIS, `Rela c~ ao Anual de Informa c~ oes Sociais'
(Annual Social Information Report) is an annual census of all rms and their employees in
Brazil conducted by the Ministry of Employment. It includes detailed information about each
employee (wages, hours worked, education, age, tenure, gender, etc) and each rm (industry,
region, size, establishment type, etc), including a unique (time-invariant) identier for each
employee, each rm and each establishment. These identiers allow one to follow workers and
rms over time.
The second data source is PIA, `Pesquisa Industrial Anual' (Yearly Industrial Research),
which covers all manufacturing sector rms with at least 30 employees and a random sample
of 10% of rms with between 5 and 30 employees. From PIA we use rms' prots and also
additional data about revenues and costs. Finally, the third data used is CCE, `Censo de
Capitais Estrangeiros' (Foreign Capital Census) is conducted by the Brazilian Central Bank
and is composed of all establishments situated in Brazil with 10% or more foreign capital
participation. Establishments' information (accountability, foreign participation of capital,
composition of capital, exports, imports, location, activity sector, number of employees, and
establishment type) are available for 1995 and 2000. We assumed that foreign ownership, the
single variable we used from CCBB, remain unchanged from 1995 to 1999 (1995 data) and
from 2000 to 2002 (2000 data).2
Tables 1 and 2 report more information about the data size. There are on average more
than 5 million workers per year and almost 25,000 rms per year. At the rm level, there
are more than 40,000 dierent rms, of which more than 12,000 are present in all six years
covered. Tables 1 and 2 also present information about the subset of exporting rms, dened
here as rms that export a non-zero share of their output in at least one year over the period
1997-2002. More than half of all employees in the data are in rms that export, although the
number of these rms is much smaller - as one may expect, exporting rms are bigger than
non-exporting rms.
We also report some descriptive statistics of the main variables in Table 3. All nancial
variables are converted to 2002 prices. One important point relates to the steep decline of
2See a working paper version of this paper, Martins & Esteves (2006), for a detailed description of these
data sets and additional results.
4the real hourly wage, of more than 20% a fact documented in many other analyses of the
manufacturing sector in Brazil. At the same time, workers schooling increased by about one
year while (Mincer) experience and tenure both fall. These events are most likely related to the
process of economic reforms introduced in the late 1980s in Brazil, when taris were reduced
substantially. The adjustment to these reforms involved substantial reallocation and marked
declines in the employment levels in the manufacturing sector. This decline is mirrored in
the declining number of workers present in our data up to 1999 (or up to 1998 in the case of
exporting rms), after which the employment level increases, although real wages keep falling.
Tenure is also relatively low, which may be related to high levels of turnover that characterise
the Brazilian labour market. Tenure also increases up to 1999 (when employment is falling)
and falls after that (when employment is increasing).
Similarly to the case of wages, wage bills also exhibit a downward trend, except for 2002.
These wage bills are derived directly from information provided by each rm, and include, on
top of net wages, also taxes, overtime pay, 13th and 14th month pay, etc. All these additional
components correspond to about 100% of net wages, a result that emphasises the heavy burden
faced by rms that hire from the formal labour market and that may help explaining the large
size of the informal labour market.
The net prots variable is also testimony to the dicult years of the Brazilian economy:
average prots are negative in 1999 and 2002, when interest rates were increased in order to
sustain the currency, while gross prots (i.e. net prots plus the wage bill) are always positive.
The descriptive statistics also indicate the importance of the external market for our
sample of Brazilian rms, as, on average, more than 10% of sales are exported. Only about
one fth of these exports go to Mercosul, while less than 2% is exported to Mercosul is 2002,
after the Argentinean peso was devalued by more than 50%. One can also see that, when
focusing only on workers whose rms export, many dierences arise. For instance, this subset
of workers are paid higher wages, they are more educated and have higher tenure. Moreover,
the prot levels of exporting rms are also higher than the entire set of manufacturing rms
in our sample (except for 2002).
53 Results
As indicated in the introduction, our analysis is based on a standard wage equation, augmented
by a measure of protability. (More details on the derivation of this equation from a model
of rm and worker bargaining are available in the theoretical appendix.) Following from







where wit is the log of the hourly wage of worker i in period t, Xit is a vector of worker
i variables in period t, Fit is a vector of rm variables (the rm that employs worker i in
period t), Lit is the net prot of the rm that employs that worker, and nit is the number of
employees of the same rm. The parameter 3 indicates the bargaining power of workers.3
3.1 Gross and Net Prots
Our initial results, presented in Table 5, are obtained using pooled OLS. In this and the
following tables, we present the coecients on a selected group of regressors and their t-
statistic values (corrected for worker clustering). On top of the regressors presented (schooling,
gender, experience, tenure, foreign rm and log rm size), we also consider in all specications
a quartic in experience; a quadratic in tenure; year, occupation, region and industry dummies;
and interactions between all human capital variables and the gender dummy. All of these
variables, in all models, present similar results to those that have been obtained for other
countries.
Column 3 of Table 5 presents the results for net prots, indicating a signicant 3 of 0.04.
When considering instead gross prots, we nd again a signicant 3 but this time about ten
times bigger, at 0.35. As expected, the use of a measure of prots that predates the payment
of the wage bill (gross prots) indicates that the more common net prots measure generates
a downward bias on the estimates of rent sharing.
A useful measure of the implications of these parameters in terms of generating wage
dierences is the Lester Range (Lester 1952). This range corresponds to four times the product
of the rent sharing parameter and the standard deviation of prots (per worker). This formula
can be interpreted as indicating the wage increase, in percentage terms, of a worker that would
3The parameter 3 corresponds to [=(1   )] in equation 11.
6move from a rm with low prots (more precisely, a rm whose protability is two standard
deviations below the mean protability of the rms in the sample) to a rm with high prots
(a rm placed two standard deviations above mean protability). The Lester ranges for these
two estimates in Table 5 are 5% and 50%, respectively.
Taking these numbers at face value, the gross prots estimate (our preferred estimate
for reasons explained before) suggests that rent sharing is indeed an important factor in the
Brazilian labour market. These values are also comparable (if not higher than) those gures
obtained for dierent developed countries: Blanch
ower et al. (1996) nds a Lester range
of 24% for the US; Hildreth & Oswald (1997) nd a gure of 16% for the UK; Arai (2003)
documents ranges between 12% and 24% for Sweden; and Martins (forthcoming) presents a
range of 56% for Portugal.
3.2 Instrumental Variables
An additional concern present in the estimation of rent sharing relates to the endogeneity of
prots. For instance, if one considers an eciency wage model, prots (even gross prots) and
wages will be simultaneously determined. Variation of prots across rms may also capture
worker unobserved characteristics that also aect those workers wages.
Our rst approach at dealing with endogeneity involves the use of instruments. The rst
set of instruments we use is made of dierent components of revenues and costs, namely those
related to nancial investments, participations in other rms, and non-operational activities.
Our identication assumption is thus that these components of prots do not aect wages
directly, although they are correlated with prots. We believe that this is likely to be true
because bargaining over wages is typically related to prots in the rm's mainstream activities,
e.g. car sales in the case of a car manufacturer. If that rm happens to benet from a bump
in prots driven by activities unrelated to the production of cars, e.g. selling o a subsidiary,
that will not have a direct impact upon wages although it will have a direct eect upon prots.
An additional important aspect concerns the macroeconomic instability of Brazil over the
period covered. The rst important episode of such instability occurred in January 1999 when
the central bank was forced to move from a xed to a 
oating exchange rate. At the same
time, in
ation targeting was adopted and interest rates were increased substantially as a way
to counteract in
ationary expectations that may have been induced by the depreciation of
7the Real. There is a second episode of interest rate hikes in 2002, following the exchange
rate pressure induced by the Brazilian presidential elections. These two events imply that
rms will see their protability negatively aected, in particular if they have engaged in large
nancial investments, implying that they will face higher interest rate payments. We thus
expect that nancial losses will be an important determinant of prots while, as argued before,
without having a direct impact on wages.
Table 6 presents our results, using the 2SLS method, considering either net or gross prots
and either only the nancial instruments or all instruments (nancial and exchange rate
instruments). Following Bound et al. (1995) and Shea (1997), we start by investigating the
strength of the instruments in the rst-stage equation, as measured by the values of the
partial R2 and the joint F-test of the instruments. In Table 7, we nd reassuring results,
as all coecients of the instruments are highly signicant and generate at least reasonable
partial R2's. Consistent with our view of the role of macroeconomic instability upon prots,
the role of nancial losses in explaining net or gross prots is not only of the expected sign
but also particularly large.
In terms of the main equation, we nd that, unlike before, the coecients are now negative,
ranging between -0.05 and -0.04, again precisely estimated. These negative ndings indicate
that rent sharing is not an important feature of the Brazilian labour market, unlike was
suggested by the approach which ignored endogeneity. The Lester ranges are also particularly
small, ranging between -8% and -6%.
Having established one of the main results of the paper, we now test the robustness of
our ndings to dierent instruments and to controls for other sources of bias. We start by
considering exchange rate 
uctuations as another dimension of the period of macroeconomic
instability faced by Brazil. As indicated before, the country sustained considerable pressure
upon its currency over those years; on top of that, the currencies of some of its neighbours -
in particular Argentina, an important trade partner under Mercosul - also faced adjustments.
These currency shocks can also be used as instruments, as a cheaper Real in terms of dollars
or euros translates into cheaper exports and thus higher prots for exporting rms.
Figure 1 describes the evolution of the three dierent exchange rates over the period. As
indicated before, the main depreciations took place in January 1999 and then in the second
half of 2002. Before that, in December 2001, Argentina also replaced its currency board with
8a 
oating system, leading to a massive depreciation of their currency with respect to the Real
and other currencies. Figure 2 describes the evolution of the interest rate: one can observe
the large instability in 1997 and 1999 and the subsequent increasing trend since the mid/late
2001, as the 2002 elections campaign progressed.
In order to exploit these events in terms of our estimation of the rent sharing parameter,
we merge into our data information from the PIA data set about the shares of sales which are
exported either to Mercosul or to the rest of the world. We then also multiply these shares
by the exchange rates of the real with respect to the Argentinean Peso or a weighted average
of the dollar and the euro (the weights being the exports from Brazil to either the US or the
European Union, in each period.)
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 present the results for the sub-sample of exporting rms and
their workers. We nd that the new estimates of the 3 parameter are still negative and of
a magnitude similar to the case of the previous set of instruments. These estimates are -0.07
and -0.05, for net and gross prots, respectively, each coecient again statistically signicant.
Lester ranges are -11% and -7%, respectively. Regarding the rst-stage results, we again nd
that our instruments are statistically signicant and of the predicted positive sign (Table 7).
This positive sign means that, the higher the share of sales that is exported, the greater the
impact of a depreciation of the Real in terms of the rms protability. It is also interesting
to notice that the role of exports to the `rest of the world' (i.e. other countries than those in
Mercosul) is much bigger than that of the exports to Mercosul.
We conclude from our instrumental variable analysis that the evidence of rent sharing
documented in simple models that do not account for the endogeneity of prots can be mis-
leading. The higher wages of employees of more protable rms are articially driven by
the simultaneous determination of prots and wages. When using shocks to prots that are
arguably unrelated to the forces that directly determine wages, then no evidence can be found
that wages increase with prots.
3.3 Spell Fixed Eects
One additional source of bias concerns the heterogeneity across rms and workers. Up until
now, this heterogeneity was assumed to be uncorrelated with prots. Moreover, dierent
observations of the same individual or the same rm over time were not treated dierently
9from the observations of dierent individuals or dierent rms.
In this sub-section we address this issue by incorporating into our instrumental variables
approach controls for worker and rm heterogeneity. Given that we are not interested in
estimating the heterogeneity itself (Abowd et al. 1999) but only in controlling for its possible
biases, we adopt a spell xed eects method. This corresponds to conducting a within-spell
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where vij denotes the worker-rm spell xed eect. Then, by mean-dierencing equation
2 with respect to the spell means, one obtains:
wit   ws = (Xit   Xs)00






) + (uit   us); (3)
in which each barred variable represents the mean of that variable for each spell over time.
Since both worker and rm heterogeneity are controlled for in this equation, the rent sharing
parameter 3 can be estimated consistently, which was not necessarily the case in the previous
sections.
Table 8 presents the results for models that include spell xed eects, rst disregarding the
endogeneity of prots and then instrumenting prots as before. We nd in both specications,
and similarly to the previous results, very small bargaining parameters and correspondingly
small Lester ranges, between -3.8% and -0.4%.4 These results strengthen our earlier ndings
that Brazilian workers do not receive any share of the rents earned by their employers.
3.4 Robustness Analysis
One possible explanation for the lack of evidence of rent sharing documented so far in the
paper is that many rms are facing losses. To the extent that rent sharing applies only
when rms have prots, then one should not expect a positive correlation between prots
and wages in our data. Moreover, as in other countries, the Brazilian labour law makes it
very dicult that rms cut their workers' nominal pay. While this constraint was obviously
4We have also run these models for net prots and the results were again qualitatively and quantitatively
very similar. These results are available upon request.
10of little practical importance during the period of high in
ation, prices have largely been
under control since the Real plan was introduced in 1994. In this context, because of either
an intrinsic asymmetry in the process of rent sharing or because of the downward nominal
wage rigidity constraint in the law, rent sharing could remain a feature of the labour market,
but one which would only emerge during periods of economic expansion or, more specically,
when rms increased their prots.
In order to test this alternative interpretation of our results, we repeat our previous analysis
for the subset of workers employed by rms with at least 30 employees and covered during
the years of 1999, 2000 and 2001. This was a period of uninterrupted economic growth in
which the economy was not aected by major shocks, growing at reasonable rates (the growth
rates of GDP per capita were 0.8%, 4.3% and 1.3%, respectively). If the hypothesis in the
previous paragraph is correct, this would necessarily be a period in which rent sharing would
be found. By focusing on larger rms, we also hope to bias our results towards higher levels
of rent sharing, as smaller rms may be aected by greater instability.
Table 9 presents information about the sample size of the new data set. It can be seen
that more than 80% of workers are employed by rms with 30 or more employees (either when
compared to all rms or only rms that export). In total, there are about 4.5 million workers
per year, of which about 2.5 million are employed by exporting rms.
Our regression results (based on the models considering gross prots, spell xed eects
and instruments - nancial variables only or nancial and export/exchange rate variables) -
see Table 10 - indicate that there is indeed only some very mild evidence that, in periods of
economic growth, rms are likely to share some of their prots with their employees. The
largest Lester range found (for the specication based on exporters and the complete set of
instrumental variables) is positive, but not bigger than 4%.
In order to be even more stringent in our analysis, we also consider a sub-sample of the
rms present in the 1999-2001 period and whose prots increased over each year (i.e. in 2000
with respect to 1999 and in 2001 with respect to 2000). Consistent with our predictions, we
nd larger Lester ranges than in our previous estimates (Martins & Esteves 2006). However,
our rent sharing parameter is never large enough so that the corresponding Lester range
exceeds 14%. This Lester range is also particularly small when comparing it to gures from
other countries: in similar analysis (i.e. considering only rms whose prots increase) and
11covering the labour markets of Sweden and Portugal, Arai & Heyman (2001) and Martins
(forthcoming), respectively, nd much larger Lester ranges, ranging between 50% and 60%.
Another possible concern is that our main data set, RAIS, does not include all wage
variables that refer to the sharing of prots between employers and employees, as the ques-
tionnaire taken by rms may be ambiguous in this specic aspect.5 In order to address this
view, we repeated our analysis using the PIA data set, which is only available at the rm-level
but which explicitly requests rms to include information about all prot-sharing schemes in
their wage data. In results not shown but available upon request, we again do not nd any
evidence of rent sharing.
Finally, we also tried to study possible dierences in the magnitude of rent sharing that
may exist across dierent types of workers. According to our simple theoretical model, one can
expect that subgroups of workers with dierent bargaining power will benet dierently from
their rm's protability. We considered subgroups dened in terms of the workers' gender,
tenure, occupation (blue- or white-collar), and education. Also in these analyses, we nd no
evidence of rent sharing, regardless of the specic subgroup examined (results not shown but
available upon request).6
4 Final Remarks
This is one of the rst papers that examines rent sharing in a developing country (see also
Teal (1996), and Bigsten et al. (2003), who focus on African countries) and is the rst that
does so exploiting particularly rich matched panel data, of the type typically only available in
some developed economies. Moreover, the quality of our data, together with the variability
of the macroeconomic environment, also allows us to pay particular attention to a number of
econometric problems that may have aected previous research.
We study the case of Brazil, a large country characterised by huge income disparities, and
examine a period in which the economy was hit by dierent macroeconomic shocks (1997-
5Incidentally, we also noticed that most papers in the rent sharing literature do not explicit mention whether
their wage data does include such prot-sharing information. Dierences across countries in this respect may
impair international comparisons of the magnitude of rent sharing.
6We also trimmed our data in dierent ways, in case the results were driven by outliers, namely in the
prots variable. We also obtained the same results as in the main sections. Moreover, we have also conducted
a specic analysis of rent sharing across three of the main foreign car manufacturing rms located in S~ ao Paulo's
industrial area (the so-called `ABC' region). Our motivation for that analysis is, in part, derived from the fact
that the unions of the car manufacturing industry in that region are known by their strong bargaining power,
possibly the strongest in Brazil. However, even for this very specic industry/region, and across dierent
specications, we found Lester ranges which never exceed 9%.
122002). Exploiting these shocks as exogenous shifters in protability, and also tackling other
econometric problems, we nd what we believe is particularly robust evidence that rent sharing
is not a feature of the Brazilian labour market. Across almost all specications, we nd
precisely estimated parameters indicating virtually zero rent sharing. Even when selecting a
relatively small subset of our data that would, in our view, bias the results towards high levels
of rent sharing, we still nd very small results, about one third of the corresponding ndings
for developed countries.
Regarding possible explanations for our evidence of no rent sharing, we believe that an
important role is played by the relative weakness of dierent labour market institutions in
Brazil. For instance, unions are relatively segmented and weak (Arbache 2002). Employment
law may also indirectly foster excessive worker turnover and thus hurt rent sharing, as rela-
tively long periods of tenure may be necessary for workers to gain signicant bargaining power
in their rms. For instance, only after investing in rm-specic skills may workers benet from
some of the rents generated by those investments. Finally, the large informal labour market
will also not help the bargaining power of workers with respect to their employers, as the
former become more easily replaceable with respect to case of countries with smaller levels of
informality.
Besides contributing to a better understanding of the labour markets of Brazil and perhaps
also other developing countries, our results may also help the analysis of the reasons for and
the policies against the extremely high levels of income inequality documented for Brazil. For
instance, to the extent that rms do not share rents, gender and racial discrimination may
be seen as less important determinants of inequality. On the other hand, our evidence shifts
emphasis towards dierences in observable and/or unobservable individual human capital
levels and in convexities in the returns to those assets as possible sources of income dispersion.
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15A Theory
This theoretical analysis follows closely Blanch
ower et al (1996). It is assumed that wages
are determined following a bargain process that corresponds to the following expression:
maxlog[((u(w)   u(w))n] + (1   )log (4)
 represents the workers bargaining power; u(w) represents the workers utility from their
wages; w represents the outside earnings workers will get if not employed in their current rm;
n indicates the employment level and  denotes prots.
If bargaining breaks down, the employer will receive zero prots and workers will receive
w wages. Prots are dened as f(n)   wn, in which f is a concave function in n.












(1   )[f0(n)   w]

= 0 (6)










u(w)  = u(w) + (w   w)u0(w) (8)
From 7 and 8 we nd:






Equation 9 establishes that the equilibrium wage is determined by the outside option of
the worker, the relative bargaining power of each party [=(1   )] and the prot per worker
(=n).
The workers outside option can also be characterised as:
16w = c(w0;b;U); (10)
in which w0 is the outside wage in other rms, b is the income level of unemployed workers
and U is the unemployment rate of workers from that rm. Equation 9 can thus be written
as:






This equation establishes a wage equation in which prots per worker are an explanatory
variable. Positive values for [=(1   )] are then understood as providing support for the









































Figure 1: US Dollar, Euro and Argentinean Peso Exchange Rate Indices




















































































































































































Figure 2: Monthly Interest Rate (%; SELIC)
Source: Brazilian Central Bank (www.bcb.gov.br)
C Tables
19Table 1: Number of Workers and Firms (All Firms or Only Exporting Firms)
All rms Exporting rms
Workers Firms Workers Firms
1997 5,507,887 21,642 2,926,827 5,033
1998 5,048,225 22,904 2,692,923 5,273
1999 4,971,535 23,678 2,705,760 5,623
2000 5,266,867 23,967 2,802,242 5,688
2001 5,474,064 25,819 2,987,354 6,086
2002 5,726,771 27,225 3,117,915 6,322
Table 2: Distribution of rm appearances in data
All rms Exporting rms
1 year 9,096 2,795
2 years 6,737 1,702
3 years 5,447 1,327
4 years 4,053 1,007
5 years 3,35 949
6 years 12,227 2,512
20Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Mean and (Standard Deviation)
Variables 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Log hourly wage 1.45 1.47 1.36 1.24 1.22 1.14
(0.94) (0.94) (0.91) (0.89) (0.89) (0.83)
Hourly wage R$ 4.26 4.35 3.90 3.46 3.38 3.13
Schooling 7.00 7.29 7.57 7.74 7.90 8.04
(3.68) (3.68) (3.67) (3.63) (3.62) (3.60)
Gender (1 if male, 0 if female) 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43)
Experience (years) 18.17 18.13 17.85 17.44 17.35 17.30
(10.95) (10.86) (10.79) (10.80) (10.86) (10.93)
Tenure (months) 50.05 51.76 51.63 48.43 47.38 46.88
(63.56) (63.89) (63.80) (62.28) (62.19) (62.07)
Ratio Mercosul exports/sales 0.022 0.024 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.018
(0.55) (0.62) (0.69) (0.65) (0.64) (0.56)
Ratio rest of the world exports/sales 0.100 0.096 0.106 0.107 0.116 0.136
(0.215) (0.210) (0.224) (0.223) (0.231) (0.250)
Ratio equity/number of workers 7,178 7,894 7,937 7,116 6,135 6,596
(16,916) (17,706) (21,021) (54,322) (14,796) (24,881)
Net prots per worker 3,366 1,812 -67 5,351 6,807 -3,212
(81,919) (86,458) (75,978) (24,185) (122,718) (337,383)
Wage bill (pw) 29,433 29,407 25,277 23,245 21,864 23,379
(34,348) (29,373) (25,911) (85,141) (22,266) (136,165)
Gross prots (pw) 32,798 31,219 25,21 28,595 28,671 20,166
(92,120) (94,453) (80,979) (169,194) (127,017) (287,223)
Financial revenues (pw) 170,78 270,63 215,87 134,02 215,46 212,56
(1,760) (3,127) (2,659) (1,319) (3,730) (3,301)
Prots in other rms (pw) 5,572 6,86 9,195 4,966 5,426 6,911
(16,203) (20,057) (33,336) (21,395) (31,723) (48,851)
Non-operation prots (pw) 2,928 2,967 3,612 3,181 3,169 4,362
(19,190) (16,773) (24,198) (19,037) (19,888) (30,716)
Financial losses (pw) 2,062 2,363 2,64 2,217 2,153 1,92
(9,551) (23,490) (27,708) (13,063) (22,514) (20,828)
Losses in other rms (pw) 1,066 1,257 1,281 1,097 1,318 1,27
(3,658) (3,714) (7,294) (3,976) (6,212) (7,678)
Non-operation losses (pw) 10,635 11,944 15,375 11,311 12,115 14,876
(22,859) (32,704) (47,207) (56,853) (63,334) (147,098)
Log rm size 6.26 6.16 6.13 6.12 6.10 6.13
(1.69) (1.74) (1.74) (1.73) (1.77) (1.81)
21Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (exporting rms only): Mean and (Standard Deviation)
Variables 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Log hourly wage 1.62 1.66 1.54 1.42 1.39 1.31
(0.98) (0.98) (0.95) (0.93) (0.94) (0.88)
Hourly wage R$ 5.05 5.25 4.66 4.13 4.01 3.70
Schooling 7.24 7.60 7.89 8.07 8.20 8.35
(3.83) (3.84) (3.84) (3.78) (3.80) (3.79)
Gender (1 if male, 0 if female) 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76
(0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Experience (years) 18.25 18.14 17.78 17.34 17.25 17.19
(10.80) (10.67) (10.57) (10.59) (10.68) (10.76)
Tenure (months) 60.77 62.25 61.87 58.15 56.31 55.91
(71.47) (71.89) (71.74) (70.07) (70.23) (70.39)
Ratio Mercosul exports/sales 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Ratio rest of the world exports/sales 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.25
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29)
Ratio equity/number of workers 9,921 11,194 11,517 10,469 8,758 9,602
(20,493) (21,689) (25,641) (73,632) (17,089) (30,091)
Net prots per worker 5,785 3,385 2,031 9,181 12,687 (5,020)
(100,524) (99,786) (76,860) (328,807) (149,554) (442,201)
Wage bill (pw) 35,596 36,287 31,199 29,918 27,388 29,978
(38,052) (34,928) (28,382) (115,577) (24,430) (181,222)
Gross prots (pw) 41,381 39,672 33,230 39,099 40,076 24,958
(111,935) (110,583) (40,238) (28,008) (40,929) (371,872)
Financial revenues (pw) 7,505 9,687 3,660 7,590 8,564 10,293
(18,757) (22,699) (40,238 (28,008) (40,929) (32,469)
Prots in other rms (pw) 4,321 4,443 4,662 5,059 5,186 7,983
(17,786) (18,954) (18,811) (23,008) (40,029) (32,469)
Non-operation prots (pw) 2,629 2,520 3,393 2,798 3,077 2,565
(10,930) (8,841) (26,438) (14,757) (29,794) (25,138)
Financial losses (pw) 13,530 15,439 21,458 16,039 17,089 22,110
(25,541) (27,205) (46,635) (72,826) (67,595) (181,532)
Losses in other rms (pw) 1,614 1,662 2,179 1,385 1,716 2,476
(10,800) (9,225) (14,314) (12,241) (10,372) (20,021)
Non-operation losses (pw) 3,286 2,428 3,636 2,671 3,292 2,593
(13,786) (13,626) (29,873) (15,341) (23,713) (22,385)
Log rm size 7.06 7.01 6.98 6.98 6.99 7.05
(1.53) (1.57) (1.57) (1.57) (1.58) (1.63)
22Table 5: OLS Regressions, Dependent variable: log hourly wage
(2) (3) (4)






























Net prot (pw) 0.04
(62.12)





2 0.64 0.64 0.65
Adj. R
2 0.64 0.64 0.65
F 326,444 324,554 331,673
Lester Range 0.05 0.50
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2)
All regressions include 6 year dummies, 105 industry dum-
mies, 9 job dummies, 27 region dummies and human capital
x gender interactions, Robust standard errors, allowing for
worker clustering;
23Table 6: 2SLS regressions, Dependent variable: log hourly wage
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial IV Financial IV All IV All IV













































2 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.64
Adj. R
2 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.64
F 238,681 238,067 126,646 126,336
Lester Range -0.08 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) All regressions include
6 year dummies, 105 industry dummies, 9 job dummies, 27 region dummies and
human capital x gender interactions, Robust standard errors, allowing for worker
clustering;
24Table 7: 2SLS Auxiliary regressions
Instruments Net Prots pw Gross Prots pw Net Prots pw Gross Prots pw
Financial IV Financial IV All IV All IV






[0.007] [0.003] [0.008] [0.0028]






[0.0006] [0.001] [0.0006] [0.0031]






[0.0068] [0.001] [0.011] [0.005]






[0.3798] [0.2575] [0.1916] [0.0696]






[0.0216] [0.0208] [0.0281] [0.0268]






[0.0171] [0.0146] [0.02814] [0.02344]
Ratio exports to Mercosul/ 0.188 0.086
total sales times Exchange (24)
 (10)

rate peso/real [0.000004] [0.000002]
Ratio exports to rest of the world/ 0.44 0.263
total sales times Exchange (109)
 (62)

rate weighted dollar-euro/real [0.00113] [0.00209]
R
2 0.4531 0.3528 0.3181 0.2195
Adj. R
2 0.4531 0.3528 0.3181 0.2194
F 154,832 101,001 39790 23735
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*); (2) All regressions include all variables
used in the second stage equation, Robust standard errors, allowing for worker clustering; (3) Shea
R
2 partial in brackets;
25Table 8: Spell Fixed Eects and Spell Fixed Eects 2SLS Regressions
(2) (3) (3)
No IV Financial IV All IV




















Gross prot (pw) -2.71E-03 -8.92E-03 -5.19E-04
R
2 0.03 0.03 0.03
Adj. R
2 0.03 0.03 0.03
F 24,363 23,884 13,049
Lester Range -0.011 -0.038 -0.004
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*);
(2)All regressions include 6 year dummies, 105 industry dum-
mies, 9 job dummies, 27 region dummies and human capital
x gender interactions, Robust standard errors, allowing for
worker clustering;
Table 9: Number of Workers and Firms (sample of rms with more than 30 workers present
in 1999-2001)
All rms Exporting rms
Workers Firms Workers Firms
1999 4,282,851 17,535 2,420,956 5,090
2000 4,498,212 17,535 2,524,928 5,090
2001 4,616,837 17,535 2,747,058 5,090
26Table 10: Spell Fixed Eects and Spell Fixed Eects 2SLS Regressions
(2) (3) (3)
No IV Financial IV All IV

























2 0.02 0.03 0.03
Adj. R
2 0.02 0.03 0.03
F 8,904 8,988 5,282
Lester Range -0.0003 0.0182 0.0313
Notes: (1) Signicant at 1% (***), 5 % (**), and 10% (*);
(2)All regressions also include a quartic in experience, a
quadratic in tenure, 6 year dummies, 105 industry dummies,
9 job dummies, 27 region dummies and human capital x gen-
der interactions, Robust standard errors, allowing for worker
clustering;
27